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EUROPEAN FUNDS FOR THE BULGARIAN AND ROMANIAN AGRICULTURE – WHAT 
IS IT ENOUGH FOR? 
After the accession of Bulgaria and Romania on 1 January 2007 the EU increased by the size of 
Germany. The population of European Union increased by 30 million inhabitants. There is now 
an additional agricultural area of 16.8 million hectares, of which 11.5 millions are arable. 
Almost 83% of the new agricultural area belongs to Romania. Both countries use more than 
50% of their total area in agriculture, which is much higher compared to the average of the 
EU-15 (40.6%) and the EU-27 (44%). 4.66 million farms joined the EU in the beginning of this 
year. 
THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR IN THE NEW MEMBER STATES 
In Bulgaria, the agricultural sector plays a much more important role in the economy, than in 
the EU-15 countries, but also compared to the ten member states joining the EU in 2004. The 
contribution of agriculture to GDP is still above 15% (2% in the EU-15). Agriculture has an 
even bigger share in employment (26.2%), which is 21.9 percentage points higher compared 
to the average of EU-15. Bulgaria has a positive agricultural trade balance. Similarly to other 
former communist countries, during the transition period, the total value of agricultural 
production declined until 1996, reaching about 62% of the 1990 level. Between 1996 and 1999 
agricultural production stabilized, or even increased up to 67% of the 1990 level. However, 
this positive period lasted only until 2000, when the production dropped again to the 1996 
level. Both crop production and livestock production has fallen heavily since 1990, but 
livestock production still dominates over crop production. The average size of farms is 4.7 
hectares, because almost 95% of farms are personal holdings producing for themselves, but 
not for the market. The most important agricultural products (based on their share of the value 
of agricultural output) are pork (around 16%), vegetables (14%), milk (12%) and cereals 
(wheat and maize – 12%).  
Romania is in a similar position than Bulgaria. Agriculture contributed to 11.4% of GDP, and 
the share of agricultural employment in total employment is even higher than in Bulgaria, 
reaching 42.8%. It means that 30.9% of agricultural employment in the EU-27 takes place in 
Romania. Concerning agricultural trade, the country is in a worse situation than Bulgaria, as 
the increasing trend of agricultural exports before 1997 stopped, and export of agricultural 
products stagnated, while agricultural imports more than doubled during the last ten years. 
Agricultural output was stable, as it decreased only by 3.5 percentage points during the 
transition period. On the contrary to Bulgaria, crop production dominates over livestock 
production, having a share of around 50% in agricultural output. The average farm size 
amounts to only 2.67 hectares, as almost 40% of holdings cultivate an area smaller than 1 
hectare, producing for own consumption. Besides cereals (16%) milk products (14%) are the 
most characteristic output of the sector. 
Adding the agricultural output of the two new member states, they produce 6% of grain, 11% 
of oilseed, 3% of beef and poultry, and 1% of pork of the European Union’s production. 
EUROPEAN FUNDS IN THE COMING FINANCING PERIOD (2007 – 2013) 
Concerning direct payments, the two new members have inherited the negotiation results of 
the 10 new members joining to the EU 3 years ago. Concerning direct payments, Bulgaria and 
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Romania will gradually phase in between 2007 and 2016. Direct payments will start at 25%, 
increasing by yearly 10%, until reaching 100% of old member states in 2016, three years 
later, compared to NMS-10. Bulgaria and Romania have also the possibility to top up EU direct 
payments to 55% in 2007, 60% in 2008, and 65% in 2009. From 2010, the top up can be 
maximally 30 percentage points above the applicable phasing in level. 
TABLE 1. CAP RESOURCES FOR BULGARIA AND ROMANIA IN THE FINANCING PERIOD 2007-2013 
(MILLIONS OF EUROS) 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Market related expenditure* 380 976 1075 1170 1261 1459 1648
Rural development 
Bulgaria 244 337 437 399 398 397 395
Romania 742 1023 1319 1236 1234 1235 1233
Sources: European Commission; *Bulgaria and Romania 
Concerning rural development funds, the two countries receive EUR 10.6 billion in the coming 
seven years, which is in case of Romania (EUR 8 billion) the fourth largest rural development 
subsidy for a member state. The tendency of rural development subsidies is the same as in the 
case of NMS-10, it is relatively stable, while the amount of direct payments will increase in this 
financing period. The relative change in the proportion of rural development subsidies in total 
subsidies aims to reach an equal share of rural development funds in each member state by 
2013. Based on the absolute numbers the two new members seem to have equal positions 
compared to NMS-10. 
CHART 1. RELATIVE EUROPEAN SUBSIDIES IN THE TWO NEW MEMBER STATES, 2007-2013 
Source: European Commission and own calculations 
However, having a look at subsidies (for the period 2007-2013) per 1 hectare agricultural 
area, per 1 hectare arable land, per capita and per agricultural employee, the situation is quite 
disappointing for the new members (Chart 1.). In case of market related expenditure, Bulgaria 
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and Romania are only slightly behind NMS-10, as they receive 72% and 79% of the subsidies 
per one hectare agricultural area and one hectare arable land respectively. Comparing market 
related expenditure divided by total population, the two countries receive even a bit more, 
than the countries of the previous enlargement. The gap between EU-15 and Bulgaria and 
Romania is extraordinary big, as Bulgarian and Romanian farmers are eligible only for a 
fraction of direct payments granted to EU-15 farmers. Concerning rural development funds, 
the gap between NMS-10 and the two new member states is smaller, (15 and 6 percentage 
points per one hectare agricultural area and one hectare arable land) and receive more than 
EU-15 countries. 
WHAT IS IT ENOUGH FOR? 
The answer to this question should be based on the last aspect of relative EU subsidies, 
subsidies per agricultural employee. As in Bulgaria more than a quarter of the population and 
in Romania almost half of the population is employed in agriculture, European subsidies are 
lagging behind concerning this aspect. Total agricultural subsidies per agricultural employee 
amounts to EUR 3262,8 in the two new member states, which is only 6.9% of the EU-15 
average and 23% of NMS-10 average. 
The subsidies planned for the period of 2007-2013 are significant, comparing to the income 
situation of Bulgaria and Romania. But it will not be enough to modernize the whole 
agricultural sector of these countries, because of the huge rural population. Thus, the 
Bulgarian and Romanian government has to decide, whether those farms having an area 
smaller than one hectare and producing for their own consumption, or for having a small, but 
additional income source, should be treated as targets of the agricultural policy or as targets of 
social policy. In case funds from the CAP will be sent on farms, being able to become 
competitive, European subsidies could boost the modernization of the agricultural sector, which 
could close the gap to the EU-15 in a few decades. Without a focusing, consequent agricultural 
and rural development strategy, the sector and rural areas will remain far away from the 
dream of becoming as viable as EU-15 countrysides. 
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KOSOVO ‐ DIVIDED AND ECONOMICALLY BACKWARD 
Although Kosovo’s future is still uncertain, by reviewing the developments of international 
politics, an independent Kosovo can be expected. Moreover, in most aspects the province is 
already de facto independent. Albanians in the province would not accept any other solution 
than full independence, while Serb politicians have just the opposite opinion.1 No doubt that 
there would be potential danger as a consequence of independence, but it must be emphasised 
that recently 16 000 troops are deployed in the province and leading Serbian or other 
countries’ politicians are not threatening with the possibility of military actions. The 
international community, the countries of the region (and Europe in a wider sense), the 
Security Council are all politically divided in the question of Kosovo, influenced by their own 
minority issues, and political and economic interests. Let us now assume that sooner or later 
Kosovo will gain its independence, and take a view at the province’s economy, its potentials 
and give some relevant background information. 
BASIC INFORMATION ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 
Different scenarios and plans emerged since 1999, but the future status and structure of 
Kosovo is still uncertain. The delay of the final status of the province sets back economic 
development and increases the tension among the ethnic groups.2 Riots and protests already 
took place, so security remains a substantial issue and will need to be supported by 
international forces in the future as well. 
Step by step Kosovo is becoming a functioning state, with its own central bank, ministries, 
local governments, etc. Institutions have been gradually built up and partly the power has 
been shifted to the local people, but the main power remains at the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Kosovo is administered by the UNMIK, which is 
headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo. Recently four 
pillars guide the implementation of UNMIK’s mandate: 
? Pillar I: Police and Justice (led by the UN) 
? Pillar II: Civil Administration (led by the UN) 
? Pillar III: Democratization and Institution Building (led by the OSCE) 
? Pillar IV: Reconstruction and Economic Development (led by the EU) 
Even if Kosovo will gain its so called independence, it won’t be sovereign in full sense, since in 
some form the international community will support and supervise the state institutions (like 
for example in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and the number of deployed troops will be cut only 
gradually, depending on the state of security. According to the “Ahtisaari plan”, an EU mission 
would replace the UN’s, and it would have significant power over Kosovo’s government. 
                                                 
1 Serbia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the following view about Kosovo’s potential independence: “Advocating a 
compromise, consensual solution to the future status of Kosovo-Metohija, the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia emphasises that imposed independence of the province will have unforeseeable negative consequences. Such 
an outcome will have far-reaching consequences on the stability of the region, impede the European perspective of the 
entire Western Balkans and present an extremely dangerous precedent for resolving minority issues and territorial 
disputes throughout Europe and the world.” (http://www.mfa.gov.yu/Facts/resolution_kim_aht_e.html) 
2 According to the UN, Kosovo’s population is approximately 1.9 million, around 90% Albanian, 6% Serb, 2% Muslim 
Slavs, 2% others (Roma, Turks, etc.). 
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Kosovo’s leading politicians have already stated that their goal is integration into the EU, thus 
EU standards are being taken over and the province is part of the Stabilisation and Association 
Process (SAP). 
… AND ABOUT THE ECONOMY 
In Kosovo the typical transition and post-war symptoms are still present, with its 
unrestructured or closed companies, outdated technology, etc. The province has the lowest 
GDP level in the region, GDP per capita is only around EUR 1 100, and although in 2004 GDP 
growth was recorded, the economy can be characterised by stagnation. (See Table 2. for 
macroeconomic indicators.) Moreover, Kosovo shows the macroeconomic problems that can be 
considered typical for South-Eastern Europe, namely the trade deficit and the unemployment. 
As a consequence of the basic problems, unemployment is pervasive. Although data are 
unreliable, unemployment is estimated to range between 35 and 50%, without taking into 
consideration the grey economy, and youth unemployment is probably even higher. 
As a result of the fact that production is Kosovo is lacking, and small-scale trade and family 
businesses dominate (mainly in the trade sector), trade balance performs very high deficit, 
and exports only cover around 6% of the imports. Exports of Kosovo are around EUR 30 
million. Bilateral Free Trade Agreements are being negotiated by the UNMIK and a regional 
free trade zone is starting to develop, but until Kosovo does not produce goods for the 
international market, mainly this may only cause the decrease of customs revenues (the 
general tariff rate is recently 10%, while for exports it is 0%). Trade deficit is partly 
compensated by the diaspora’s remittances and foreign aid. The large group of non-residents 
also supports the economy with their consumption, which is over EUR 100 million. On the 
other hand we must note that the amount of remittances, aid and the number of foreign 
employees has been declining, signalling further economic difficulties in the future. 
All these facts hint that Kosovo is aid dependent. Kosovo received and receives financial 
support from various international institutions. Also the IMF supported the province, although 
special circumstances were needed, due to the fact that Kosovo is not a member of the IMF, 
since officially it is not recognised as a country. According to the UN, the cost of reconstruction 
and recovery between 1999 and 2003 was approximately USD 2.34 billion, while the 
contribution from the international community between 1999 and 2004 reached EUR 2.76 
billion. 35% of the aid was donated by the EU and 13.5% by the USA. Donor commitments for 
2006 reached EUR 169 million, while in the previous year it amounted to EUR 241 million. In 
2006, EBRD lended EUR 17 million and EIB EUR 20 million in order to support the development 
of Pristina International Airport and of the financial sector. 
Inflation can be considered low. As far as the monetary issues and the financial sector is 
concerned, after the war institutes like the IMF had to face the fact that there was a lack of 
financial infrastructure with no central bank or other banks. Step by step the financial sector, 
the regulatory and supervisory framework is being built out, and the Banking and Payments 
Authority of Kosovo (BPK) gradually shifted into a de facto central bank and has been 
transformed in September 2006 into the Central Banking Authority of Kosovo (CBAK), handling 
all the regular functions. CBAK regulates and supervises six banks and eight insurance 
companies, pension funds, micro finance institutions, etc. Kosovo uses euro as its currency. 
The banking sector is growing in all terms. For example the use of credit cards is increasing, 
but Kosovo is still quite much cash-oriented. 
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TABLE 2. MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS OF KOSOVO, 2002-2005 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Real GDP growth (%) -2.9 -1.4 3.7 -0.5 
Inflation (%) 3.6 1.6 -1.6 1.9 
M2/GDP (%) 41.0 42.6 44.9 47.6 
Bank assets/GDP (%) 19.3 24.0 31.8 39.2 
Deposits of the private sector (% of GDP) 16.7 20.5 20.1 34.1 
Credit to private sector (% of GDP) 3.5 9.6 14.9 20.9 
Foreign aid inflow (millions of euros) 215.98 169.75 100.56 n.a. 
Source: BPK, IMF, MEF, RIMS 
Among the main problems that enterprises and potential investors must face is the poor 
infrastructure and a very problematic energy supply system. The educational system also 
needs to be improved, because there is lack of skilled workforce. Corruption is widespread. 
Unfortunately landmines are still scattered over Kosovo, including the agricultural and 
industrial areas. A small and relatively poor market may also be a disadvantage, even if we 
can speak of a so called pan-Albanian market with 6 million consumers. It is important to note 
that until the status of the province is uncertain, there will be a lack of investments. 
OPPORTUNITIES AND SUSTAINABILITY 
A key issue is the sustainability of Kosovo, which can be supported by certain opportunities. 
The province inherited mines and factories from ex-Yugoslavia, but in many cases these are 
closed or inefficient, thus large financial investments are needed to help these companies 
function again. The former Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have already started to be 
privatised by the Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA), and the first success stories appeared. These 
SOEs range from mining, wineries, construction companies, glass production factories, 
warehouses, etc. Kosovo is trying to attract investors by business friendly environment, which 
is incorporated by one of the lowest tax rates in the region. VAT rate is 15%, but 0% for 
certain agricultural goods and personal income tax rate is between 0 and 20%. 
Certain opportunities ought to be named. In case the infrastructure will be further developed, 
the province can function as a major crossroad in the region. Kosovo has very good attributes 
for the agricultural sector, which gave around one third of the GDP in 1995. The province has 
abundance of raw materials and natural resources. For example large amount of lignite 
reserves that can be exploited in surface mines, but Kosovo has zinc, lead, copper, nickel, etc. 
as well. Electric power, mining, metallurgy, construction materials, agriculture are named as 
priority fields, and recently tourism is also starting to gain attention. 
Further institutional development is needed, although due to the activity of the international 
institutes, the background of a functioning state and a market economy is being laid down. At 
certain sectors a broad regional integration may underpin development. It goes without saying 
that the financial assistance of international donors will remain inevitable in the near future, 
but aid dependency ought to be altered by foreign investments. However, as noted before, 
many problems and hazards are present that gradually must be eliminated or handled. 
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THE INSTRUMENT FOR PRE‐ACCESSION ASSISTANCE (IPA) 
The beginning of 2007 meant automatically the end and termination of the three financial 
instruments for pre-accession process, namely PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD; of the Turkish pre-
accession assistance and of the CARDS, which was inspired to support the Western Balkan 
countries in the process of the accession towards the European Union.  
Tasks and responsibilities they included are implemented into the new, contracted and 
common IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance), which came into force on 1st January, 
2007, and extends on the candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey) and on the 
potential candidate countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia including 
Kosovo) for the period 2007-2013. According to EC representatives, the goal is to modernise 
pre-accession assistance and place it in a single framework and single regulation, but the IPA 
instrument is also meant to ‘rationalise and simplify procedures and improve coherence and 
co-ordination of the activities undertaken’.   
To summarize the IPA’s main objectives, they are to support “institution-building and the rule 
of law, human rights, including the fundamental freedoms, minority rights, gender equality and 
non-discrimination, both administrative and economic reforms, economic and social 
development, reconciliation and reconstruction, and regional and cross-border cooperation.” 
The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance makes up of five main components, from which 
the last three is available only for the candidate countries. They main objective is the 
preparation of the introduction of essential “handling” structures and the familiarization of 
structure of the structural funds. The elements are the followings: 
1. Transition Assistance and Institution Building. It relates to assistance and activities in 
the areas of the institutional development, investments in harmonisation with the 
European legislation, building administrative and judiciary capacity as well as other 
measures not covered by the remaining components. 
2. Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation 
3. Regional Development, which is designed to prepare the countries for the 
implementation of the Community's cohesion policy, and for the European Regional 
Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund 
4. Human Resources Development, which element regards preparation for cohesion policy 
and the European Social Fund 
5. Rural Development, which is concerned with preparation for the common agricultural 
policy and related policies and for the European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD). 
The main explanation of the separation of components according to the status of certain 
countries is coming from difference of economies’ and governments’ preparedness for 
accession. With using the assistance of the last three elements the candidate countries is 
preparing for full implementation of the acquis communitaire of the European Union at the 
time of accession, while the potential countries are under the pressure to adopt by degrees the 
Community acquis. But the separation does not mean that the potential countries cannot 
access to arrangements provided to candidate countries. They can use Community funds for 
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Regional Development, Human Resources and Rural Development as well, but only ‘within the 
framework of the first two components’ and in decentralised way. 
Initially, the EC had projected EUR 14 billion for the region in the framework of IPA, but the 
adoption of the EU 2007-2013 budget made it clear that the amount cannot be higher than 
about EUR 11 billion for the next seven years. 
‘Divided by years and per capita, that amounts to 13 euros annually. The countries in the 
Central and East Europe that joined the EU in 2004 received 27 euros per capita annually’, the 
daily Dnevnik said, citing Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, a European MP from Hungary. According to the 
present conception about the volume of the assistance the European Union (especially the 
European Parliament) may increase the amount to the level to 20 Euros per capita in the 
future. The next table shows the Pre-Accession Assistance envelopes for 2007-2009 in Euro 
million: 
TABLE 3. PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE ENVELOPES FOR 2007-2009 
( IN EURO MILLION)  
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Croatia  140 138.5 146 151.2 
Macedonia  43.6 59.5 70.2 81.8 
Turkey  500 497.2 538.7 566.4 
Albania  45.5 61 70.7 81.2 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  51 62.1 74.8 89.1 
Montenegro  59.3 31.4 32.6 33.3 
Serbia  19.5 186.7 190.9 194.8 
Kosovo 167 63.3 64.7 66.1 
TOTAL 1024.1 1099.7 1188.6 1263.9 
Source: SEERECON 
The implementation of IPA’s measures and assistance is anchored through annual and multi-
annual programmes. All programmes are compiled to answer the documents with multi-annual 
plans, which means, that the Commission has presented the main objectives and priorities for 
each countries in a three-year strategy document. 
The European Parliament has the right to initiate the suspension of the assistances by the 
Commission, or vica versa (set them back), if it is justified by the ‘behaviour’” of the 
beneficiary country. 
The main objective of the European Union regarding the South East European countries is to 
help in the fields of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom. For the last decade, the EU has 
been at the forefront of efforts to make this aim a reality. 
The continuation of the enlargement process is the historical task and responsibility of the 
European Union. The role of IPA is in this procedure to ensure assistance for the candidate and 
potential candidate countries to achieve the terms of the accession. It is a further responsibility 
to associate to these objectives adequate budget funds. The plan of the EU’s budget was not 
liberal to the IPA, but the concerned are confident that the supervision in 2008/2009 will give 
a chance to the correction. 
ICEG EC–MEHIB SEE Monitor 2007/3. 
. 
 
11
STABILISING LABOUR MARKET IN BULGARIA 
Positive trends of 2005 continued in the Bulgarian labor market in the previous year. 
Employment increased by 61.7 thousand during this period resulting in higher activity rate. 
The unemployment rate decreased by 1.2 percentage points to 8.9% and long-term 
unemployment showed a decreasing trend as well. 
TENDENCIES OF EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
After the shock of the transition period Bulgaria seems to be on the way of recovery 
concerning employment and unemployment. Unfavorable external conditions combined with 
the low speed of restructuring and privatization led to a decrease of 37.7% in employment 
between 1989 an 1999. The lowest employment was reached in 2001 (2702 thousand) and 
since then employment increased at a slow pace. Employment of the third quarter of 2006 
meant a 3.3% growth compared to the same period of the previous year and being the second 
highest after the initial employment level (4366 thousand) of 1989. The employment situation 
of men and women is quite similar, however, employment of women grew by 4.4% which is 
1.9 percentage points higher compared to the growth of the number of male employees. 
The sectoral changes of employment followed the restructuring of the economy, however this 
process was rather slow. The only sector experiencing a decline (also) in the number of 
employees was the secondary sector, as the share of industry from total employment 
decreased by 18.5 percentage points to 26.2% between 1989 and 1999. Thanks to faster 
economic growth the share of the secondary sector increased to 34.6% by the end of 2005 
and remained at that level in the last year as well. The share of agriculture in total 
employment experienced an 8 percentage point increase in the first ten years after the change 
of regime. Since then the proportion of the primary sector in employment is stagnating. The 
tertiary sector remained underrepresented compared to the average of the EU, as it reached 
47% by 1999 and grew only by three percentage points until the third quarter of 2006. 
Large scale unemployment (over 20%) was an unknown problem before the transition. Huge 
number of unemployed meant high social expenditure for the budget, which had to make 
restrictions on the entitlement to receive unemployment benefit. The unemployment rate 
reached its peak in 1993 (21.4%) and has been stagnating since then. 2003 can be considered 
as a turning point. Strong economic growth facilitated not only employment but contributed to 
a significant decrease of the unemployment rate as it fell by 4.4 percentage points. In the first 
quarter of 2006 the proportion of unemployed has become a one digit number for the first time 
since 1989. Thy dynamic decrease of unemployment seems to continue as the rate dropped by 
0.9 percentage points between the first and third quarter of the previous year. 
Interestingly female unemployment has been lower in the last eight years before 2006. The 
reason for the higher number of male unemployed is the continuing privatization process and 
job reduction in sectors where male employment prevails (mining, chemicals, some 
manufacturing branches). There were more women among unemployed in the beginning of the 
transition period when industries such as textiles, food, clothing or tobacco faced privatization. 
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CHART 2. UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN BULGARIA 1996-2006 
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Long-term and youth unemployment are still the biggest problem in the Bulgarian labor 
market. 56.4% of unemployed did not have a job for more than a year in the third quarter of 
2006, which is a 5.5 percentage point decrease compared to the same period of 2005. 
Although long term unemployment is on a backward trend, it will remain a serious problem in 
the coming years. Youth unemployment has been significantly higher than adult’s 
unemployment. 35.5% of people aged 15-24 were unemployed in 2002. The situation of this 
age group eased by the third quarter of 2006 since youth unemployment dropped to 19.4%. 
Although youth unemployment declined significantly in the last 4 years, the rate is still twice 
the rate of total unemployment. 
WAGES AND LABOR COST 
Changes in real wages depended mainly on inflation in the first ten years of the transition 
period. The increase of nominal wages were a kind of compensation for inflation, thus it was 
not fully determined by labor demand and supply. Because of inflation peaks, real wages 
decreased by more than 17% in 1991, 1994, and between 1996 and 1997. Declining wages 
meant reducing labor costs, which decelerated the adjustment of companies to economic 
conditions, maintaining a bad employment structure. Real wages have been growing since 
1998. Positive economic tendencies appeared in wages as well, as the annual growth of real 
wages reached 10% in 2005 and 2006. 
ICEG EC–MEHIB SEE Monitor 2007/3. 
. 
 
13
CHART 3. LABOUR COST AND PRODUCTIVITY 2000-2006 
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Source: Bulgarian National Statistical Institute 
Labor productivity is relatively low, amounting to EUR 6541 (GDP/employee), which is only 
33.8% of the EU25 average. In the previous year productivity of the Bulgarian labor force grew 
by 3%. Average labor cost was approximately EUR 3000 less than GDP per employee in 2000. 
Comparing productivity growth with labor cost index, the deflated labor cost index remained 
below the growth rate of productivity since 2000, except for one year. Thus, labor has been 
getting relatively cheaper. Additionally, the large proportion of shadow economy in Bulgaria 
helps to keep labor costs low. 
EXPECTATION 
Because of the slow transition process and the long recession period, passive and active labor 
market policy had only limited possibilities to compensate the negative effects of negative 
economic processes. The passive labor market policy became more and more restrictive 
concerning criteria for benefit entitlement. Thanks to buoyant economic growth, conditions are 
now favorable for active labor market policy measures such as job creation schemes, self-
employment promotion, job creation in regions with high unemployment rate, programs for 
increasing labor force mobility, training and retraining, special programs for youth, early 
retirement, public work etc. With the help of these measures the Bulgarian government could 
benefit more from the favorable economic conditions and facilitate the structural changes on 
the labor market. In case of continuing economic growth and a successful labor market policy 
activity rate could reach the EU average 70% and unemployment could be rolled back to 5% in 
the coming 4-5 years. 
